

Blitzkrieg in Retrospect

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Film footage of German victories during the opening phases of World War II in Europe brings to mind a term synonymous with German successes—blitzkrieg. This word might be one of the most used and abused terms from the war, and after 60 years, it is still often misunderstood even by professional military officers.

Since 1945, the U.S. Army has studied German methods of war diligently and has even developed doctrine based on these studies. Still, too often, blitzkrieg is depicted as a new way of war, a doctrine, or a virtual revolution in military affairs.

“Blitzkrieg” combines two German words, one means “lightning,” the other means “war,” and should probably be regarded as a catchword. Commander in Chief of the German Army Hans von Seeckt was likely correct when he stated, “Catchwords . . . are necessary for those who are unable to think for themselves.”¹

The term blitzkrieg, became popular during the 1939 Polish Campaign and subsequent invasions of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Its first use in the Western press appears to have been in a 25 September 1939 *Time* article during the waning phases of the Polish Campaign. The correspondent wrote, “This is no war of occupation, but a war of quick penetration and obliteration—blitzkrieg— lightning war.”² At the same time, Commander in Chief of the German Army Field Marshall Walther von Brauchitsch was termed a “blitzkrieger.”³ So began what one German author refers to as “die blitzkrieg legende.”⁴ Military historian Sam J. Lewis notes in *The Forgotten Legions: German Infantry Policy, 1918-1941*, that the origins of the term might be found in Fritz Sterberg’s book *Germany and a Lightning War*.⁵

Adolf Hitler was perhaps the best source to question the German acceptance of the term. Although Hitler clearly understood the power of catchy words or phrases, he said, “I have never used the word blitzkrieg because it is a totally nonsensical word.”⁶ On another occasion he showed his disdain for the term: “Blitzkrieg, the word is a pure Italian fabrication, Italian phraseology, a translation out of the Italian language.”⁷

Blitzkrieg gained widespread acceptance through usage by British and U.S. journalists. The Germans used the term “bewegungskrieg,” a war of movement, to describe the type of warfare they were waging. However, the term was not as catchy and did not have the propaganda effect of the word blitzkrieg, but once the term began to appear in the Western press, the Germans quickly capitalized on it and fed the West with propaganda about its advance against Poland and France.

What exactly was blitzkrieg? The term was more common in the Allied press than in German periodicals. Many military writers have attempted to describe what it means. In his article “Blitzkrieg,” Daniel Hughes best summarizes what blitzkrieg was and was not: “On the battlefield and in campaigns[,] blitzkrieg was a result or perhaps an ex post facto description of the result. It was never a tactical or operational system.”⁸

Hughes’ definition is the best overall description of blitzkrieg. So, what were commentators attempting to describe when they wrote about blitzkrieg? Was it a new doctrine emphasizing mechanized warfare—motorized spearheads thrusting deep into the rear of Polish or French positions? Was it warfare à la Heinz Guderian, the enthusiastic apostle of mechanized warfare who in many

ways epitomized German successes in the early ground war campaigns?⁹

When the word blitzkrieg began emerging in the Western press, the Germans were not truly waging a mechanized war. In the Polish Campaign of 1939, or in France and the Low Countries in 1940, the German Army was simply not the mechanized force that some assume.

For the initial attack on Poland, the Germans concentrated a total of 54 divisions, of which 7 were Panzer, 4 were motorized, and 4 were designated as mechanized light divisions.¹⁰ These were the only divisions that had organic motorized transport. The rest of the force was infantry that had a considerable amount of horse transport, including horse-drawn artillery. A typical German infantry division of the period used 5,375 horses and only 942 motor vehicles of all types. In such divisions, German infantry marched. Few, if any, rode trucks. In 1939, tanks were in short supply, and infantry personnel carriers were virtually unknown. In fact, the German Army did not have the resources to field or fuel the mechanized force of popular imagination.

German armored units in the field had yet to receive modern, dependable tanks in any significant number. Of the 3,000 armored vehicles of all types available to the German Army in 1939, more than two-thirds were either Mark I or Mark II variants, with the Mark I (Light) being most common in the inventory.¹¹ Designed as a training vehicle, the Mark I’s armament consisted of only two 8-millimeter (mm) light machineguns mounted in the turret. Mark IIs were also still in the inventory in large numbers and their main gun armament consisted of only a 20-mm cannon. To wage any level of mechanized warfare, the Germans had to impress Model 35 and 38 tanks from captured Czech inven-

tories to fill out requirements.¹²

Compared to the Polish Army, the German Army had substantial armored or mechanized assets, but an objective review of the campaign indicates that hard-hitting, well-trained infantry, well-supported by artillery, armor, and tactical air assets, was the secret of their success. Armor enhanced combat power, but mechanized forces enhanced rather than dominated the 1939 German way of war. This, then, was the German Army that fought and won a major victory over Poland.

Did the term blitzkrieg depict a new doctrinal concept that enabled German units to have such spectacular success in Poland, the Low Countries, and France? In reality, a blitzkrieg doctrine did not exist. Even though postwar writers have attempted to condense the elements of what they term blitzkrieg into some basic principles or rudimentary doctrine and even relate them to the U.S. doctrines that emerged in the late 1970s, their hypothesis rests on the study of battles and campaigns rather than period German military literature.¹³ Blitzkrieg actually owed more to concepts of the past than it did to new or emerging doctrine. German operations were in many respects a return to or, perhaps, a reaffirmation of the traditional German military approach—bewegungskrieg (wars of movements), a concept deeply rooted in military operations during the late 19th century.

Prussian Field Marshals Helmuth Graf von Moltke and William Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) dominated German military thought during the last half of the 19th century. Understanding the thoughts of Von Moltke (the Elder) is important to understanding blitzkrieg. He and later strategists were intent on waging a type of war based on rapid, decisive maneuver.¹⁴ In his opinion, such maneuver could be facilitated by the emerging technology that he clearly appreciated—railroads, breech-loading rifles, and the telegraph—which, if properly used, could help the German Army gain military victories. These concepts were used in the wars of German unification, first with the 1866 war against the Hapsburg Empire and, later, in the 1870-1871 Franco-

Prussian War.¹⁵

For Von Moltke, frontal attacks against a disciplined enemy force were to be avoided at all costs. Such attacks were to be used only to fix an enemy force while engaging in an envelopment against the flanks.¹⁶ Von Moltke's war philosophy was further developed and disseminated to the Imperial German officer corps through the influence of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen. Von Schlieffen, like Von Moltke, promoted the concept of envelopment by rejecting frontal assaults and promoting Von Moltke's basic philosophy—rapid, decisive maneuver to bring about a rapid decision on the battlefield.¹⁷

Von Schlieffen contributed to German military thought by refining and expanding Von Moltke's concepts. He was intrigued by the concept of vernichtungsgedanke (annihilation) where the commander would, through enveloping movements to the flanks and rear, destroy an enemy army's capability to function as an effective fighting force. Through such envelopments, a commander could create kessels (caldrons) and systematically destroy an encircled enemy force.

Von Schlieffen's influence on the German conduct of war was evident in August 1914 with the implementation of the often maligned Schlieffen Plan, with which the Imperial Army attempted to conduct its single-wing envelopment through Belgium and Luxembourg.¹⁸ The plan ultimately failed and spared the Allies from annihilation. The sweep to the right wing was too vast, and human and materiel resources were too small for the task. In addition, military planners weakened the right wing by flirting with a double-wing envelopment. They compounded their error by suffering a loss of nerve during the Plan's early execution, which resulted in sending German troops east to stop the advance of the Russian Colossus.

When the Schlieffen Plan failed, it seemed to be more than a failure of a single German general staff officer's plans. It was a failure of a philosophy. In the wake of its failure, many questioned whether the concept of quick decisive victory through ma-

neuver and envelopment was valid in an era of modern weapons that seemed to give the defense a significant advantage.

The failure of Von Schlieffen's masterstroke, which had been the capstone of German prewar planning, caused a virtual calcification of German thought and reaction for several months. When the German Army recovered in spirit from the failure to achieve a rapid victory, they were confronted with a coherent line of defense from the Swiss border to the North Sea with no flanks to turn. Disastrous frontal assaults against prepared positions resulted. From that point until the spring of 1918, murderous frontal assaults on the Western Front were the order of the day. The German army could neither gain positional nor strategic advantage. Not until 1918 was an attempt made through the kaiser schlacht to revive mobile warfare, and by then, it was simply too late for Germany.

During the early 1920s, German analysts, at the direction of Hans von Seeckt, analyzed the lessons of World War I. Their studies produced the Reichsheer's first significant doctrinal product, *Führung und Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen*, a tactical manual.¹⁹ The manual, released in two parts, first in 1921 and, subsequently, in 1923, rejected positional warfare in World War I as an aberration. Instead, it emphasized the traditional philosophy espoused by Von Moltke—the importance of mobile operations in warfare. The manual, returning to key concepts from late-19th-century German military thought, promoted the superiority of the offensive and underscored the advantages of envelopments, particularly when combined with frontal assaults.

Of even greater significance, when Germany went to war in 1939, its men and officers had been schooled in the precepts laid down in a 1933 German publication called *Die Truppenführung*.²⁰ *Die Truppenführung* was largely written by Generals Ludwig Beck, Werner von Fritsch, and Otto von Stulpnagel and should be regarded as an update and expansion of *Führung und Gefecht* (leadership and combat). The work provided a conceptual framework for

the German practice of warfare in World War II.

Die Truppenführung is not so much a doctrinal manual, in the American sense, although it includes many doctrinal concepts, as it is a philosophy of war, an approach to war, or a synthesis of the German way of war, drawing from, in particular, German military thinkers of the previous 100 years. The work provided the German Army broad fundamental concepts of how to wage war, which commanders applied depending on the circumstances.

Die Truppenführung provided the necessary framework for German infantry and tank commanders. When it was issued, armored divisions were only a future dream for the German Army because having armored units, as well as the Luftwaffe, was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Nonetheless, German commanders received the necessary guidance from this publication, which provided concepts for adherents of mechanized warfare, even though the philosophy of war was not exclusively designed for mechanized formations.

To regard *Die Truppenführung* as a mere return to the past would be erroneous.²¹ Martin van Creveld's charge that Von Seeckt, the ultimate godfather of *Die Truppenführung*, was a restorer rather than an innovator is only partially correct. New concepts were added to encourage or enhance mobile warfare. For example, a prominent theme in *Die Truppenführung* was the importance of leadership on the battlefield. Before World War I, commanders at army and even corps level had considerable discretion in how to accomplish their missions. *Die Truppenführung* extended this discretion to a far lower level. German leaders were encouraged to think and act independently: "The command of an army and its subordinate units requires leaders capable of judgment, with clear vision and foresight, and the ability to make independent and decisive decisions, and carry them out unwaveringly and positively."²²

Leaders capable of exercising a degree of independence on the

battlefield could give mission-oriented orders that required that the superior officer to clearly provide his intent, and that officers down to company level have the courage and experience to accomplish the mission.²³

A second concept resulting from post-World War I studies was the importance of using a combined arms approach on the battlefield. This concept was also first introduced in the early 1920s in *Führung und Gefecht*.

What some called blitzkrieg was not the use of armored divisions, not the mechanization of the German Army, nor (in the American sense) doctrine. It was an art, a way of war, that stressed mobility facilitated by mechanized units and the use of combined arms, both of which produced the necessary firepower to promote maneuver warfare. The firepower needed to break through enemy resistance in Poland and in France came from coordinated efforts of armor and artillery, amply supported by a largely tactical air force and the firepower of the German infantry division.

Firepower, the concentrated efforts of the combined arms team on the battlefield and the return to mobile operations were referred to by journalists as blitzkrieg. Proponents of mechanized warfare, like Hans Guderian, sought to claim blitzkrieg as their own. In the 1939-1940 campaigns, blitzkrieg was considered to be the use of combined arms that facilitated maneuver on the battlefield. Armored units, the German Air Force with its JU-87 (the famous Stuka), the Heinkel 111 (deadly accurate artillery), and even the increased firepower available to the individual infantry company gave German forces their tremendous edge on the battlefield.²⁴

Distinguished military historian Williamson Murray, author of several well-known works on World War II, said, "*Die Truppenführung* remains the most influential doctrinal manual ever written and to a considerable extent explains the extraordinary battlefield performance of German ground forces in Hitler's wars of conquest."²⁵ Despite the existence of what was initially a forward-looking philosophy of war, as depicted in *Die*

Truppenführung, the Wehrmacht never really achieved the level of mechanization it desired so as to give its forces maximum mobility for its campaigns.

The Wehrmacht never came close to the level of mechanization the U.S. Army used to break out of the Bocage in 1944 in its race across France. Granted, in the 1941 campaign against the Soviet Union, the sort of feats that some ascribe to the blitzkrieg campaigns of 1939-1940 actually transpired. For example, in 1941, with excellent terrain and much better quality and numbers of tanks, Guderian's Panzer Group II moved from Brest-Litovsk to Borisov, a distance of 273 miles, in 7 days. On one of those days alone, the Panzer group advanced 72 miles. Even then, reliance on horses for mobility never truly ceased.

The Germans owed their victories of 1939 to 1940 to a return to an emphasis on mobility on the battlefield, an application of firepower through combined arms, and a stressing of boldness and initiative. As U.S. officers study the development of the military art, the key concepts in *Die Truppenführung* still offer important guidance to this and future generations. The importance of using a combined arms team and the ability to use massed firepower, boldness, and initiative on the battlefield by well-trained leaders are still valid concepts. Stripping away myths from words like blitzkrieg reveals there are still concepts to be learned from the German way of war. Blitzkrieg might have been a myth, but the concepts that spawned the myth are still valid. **MR**

NOTES

1. Hans Von Seeckt in Matthew Cooper, *The German Army, 1933-1945* (Lanham MD: The Scarborough House, 1978), 113.

2. "Blitzkrieg," *Time* (25 September 1939): 25.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Karl Heinz Friesser, "Der West Feldzug und die Blitzkrieg Legende" in *Ideen und Strategien, 1940, Ausgewählte Operationen und deren Militärgeschichtliche Aufarbeitung*. Herausgegeben vom Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, Freiburg im Breisgau (Herford und Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1990), 159-204.

5. Samuel J. Lewis, *The Forgotten Legions: German Infantry Policy, 1918-1941* (New York: Praeger, 1985); Fritz Sternberg, *Germany and a Lightning War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1939). Note also, Colonel Robert Doughty accurately noted that 1930s German writers used the terms, blitzartig or blitzschlag in their descriptions of a short war, (Doughty, "The Myth of Blitzkrieg," presentation, Strategic Studies Institute's Annual Strategy Symposium, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1998, 3.)

6. For the purist: "Ich habe noch nie das Wort blitzkrieg verwendet weil es ein ganz blodsinniges Wort ist," Karl-Heinz Friesser, *Die Blitzkrieg Legende* (München: R.

Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), 5.

7. Again for the purist: *blitzkrieg, das Wort ist eine reine italienische Erfindung, italienische Phrasologie, eine Übersetzung aus dem Italienischen*. . . Friesser, "Der Westfeldzug und die Blitzkrieg Legende," 159.

8. Daniel J. Hughes, "Blitzkrieg," Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, ed., in *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 1993), 380.

9. Hans Guderian came to epitomize blitzkrieg. See *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten* (panzer leader) and Kenneth Madsey, *Guderian, The Creator of Blitzkrieg* (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), 217.

10. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2000), 46-47. See also Friesser, 168.

11. Friesser, 44.

12. See Walter Spielberger and Uwe Feist, *Panzer-Kampfwagen IV: "Workhorse" of the German Panzertruppe* (Berkeley, CA: Feist Publications, 1968), 4.

13. Len Deighton, *Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1979), or Paul Tiberi, "German versus Soviet Blitzkrieg," *Military Review* (September 1985): 63-71.

14. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (Novato, CA: Persio Press, 1993), 201. Von Moltke repeatedly uses the term *bewegungskrieg* in his writings showing significant continuity in thought and in terminology.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Hughes, 155. Helmuth Graf von Moltke said, "Infantry whose flanks are secured is unconquerable as long as it pays no attention to losses inflicted by long-range fire and as long as it preserves its equanimity."

17. See Antulio J. Echevarria II, *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 174-76.

18. Echevarria, "Infamous Legacy: Schlieffen's Military Theories Revisited," *Army History: The Professional Bulletin of Army History* (Summer-Fall 2001): 1-8.

19. James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 55-57.

20. For an English translation of *Die Truppenführung*, see Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, trans. and eds., *On the German Art of War: Truppenführung* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publisher, 2001).

21. See Martin Van Creveld, *Fighting Power: The German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 134.

22. *Truppenführung (T.F.) I Teil (Abschnitt I-XIII)*, with an introduction by Freiherr von Hammerstein-Equord (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1936), 3-4. For the English version, see Condell and Zabecki, 4-5.

23. *Auftragstaktik*, the philosophy of providing officers with mission-oriented orders is inherent in *Die Truppenführung*. The term, however, is not used in the manual. The philosophy became famous in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-3, *Air Assault Division Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1980).

24. At the time, the German infantry had the best light machinegun in existence—the MG-34. With its cyclic rate of 1,000 to 1,200 revolutions per minute and its tactical use, the Germans had the clear edge on the battlefield.

25. Murray, "Leading the Troops: A German Manual of 1933," *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 1999): 95-98. Corum's introduction to the English translation of *Die Truppenführung*, "German Army Regulation 300, *Die Truppenführung*," 1933, is one of the most important expressions of doctrine in military history.

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MR Insights

Fashioning a U.S.-Israeli Military Alliance

Edward Bernard Glick, Ph.D.

The United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations have fashioned a road map leading to permanent Palestinian-Israeli peace. The map includes ending terror and violence against Israel; stopping the construction of new Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state in the Middle East; and the creation of a sovereign Palestine by 2005.

The United States must take the following steps as soon as possible:

- Establish a U.S. naval base in Haifa; air bases and listening stations in the Galilee and Negev regions; and Army and Marine installations at mutually agreed-on Israeli sites.

- Insist that the future Palestinian state accept Israel's right to exist in sovereign serenity within its 1967 borders.

- Support a Greater Jerusalem that would be physically undivided but politically cantonized.

- Sign a mutual defense treaty that does not give Israel *carte blanche* authority but declares that it is a U.S. Ally.

Moderate Palestinians want Israel to return to its pre-1967 borders and to accept an independent Palestinian

state. Most moderate military officers do not want to continue Israel's 35-year-long Palestinian occupation or see the annexation of some 2 million Arabs, who would eventually destroy the essence of Zionism, to which a majority of people in Israel adhere.

Moderate Israelis remember that the pre-Six-Day War frontiers brought them neither peace nor security. The United States should not put Israel in a position where this might happen again.

Extreme Israelis want an Israel without Palestine. Extreme Palestinians want a Palestine without Israel. So neither will be happy with any U.S.-inspired arrangement even if it would lead to a stable peace. Russia, whose influence now extends only to Syria and Iraq, will accept whatever arrangements the Israelis and Palestinians accept, even as it tries to extract maximum credit for them. Saudi Arabia will also accept any solution because it knows that its days of using oil as a political and economic weapon are numbered. Western Europeans in the area appear to be irrelevant.

The United States has no naval or air bases on the southern shores of

the Mediterranean, and no one knows how long such bases will continue to be allowed on the northern shores in places like Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece.

U.S. military and naval presence in Israel allows the United States to use Israeli territory as a staging area in any war in the region. A closer interlocking of Israeli and U.S. interests would show friends and foes exactly where America stands and how far it will go to ensure the existence of the only democracy in the Middle East.

Israel can no longer pay for wars—not in money, not in weapons, and not in lives. The Israelis are ready to accept a Palestinian state, but only if they are convinced that they will be safe under the U.S. umbrella. America is the keystone in the whole structure.

Every U.S. president from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush has urged the Arabs and the Israelis to take risks for peace, to forget their differences, and be as daring during wars as they have been during them. But when will the United States take risks for Middle East peace that might produce U.S. casualties? When will the United States cease being the prisoner of a past that has clouded

judgment and immobilized actions with regard to so many post- and non-Vietnam issues?

In 1948, Truman broke the Soviet blockade of West Berlin with a massive around-the-clock airlift. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy told the Germans in his famous “Ich-bin-ein-Berliner” speech that America had

helped the city during its great crises and would help again if needed. Bush and the U.S. Congress must make it clear to everyone that Israel’s survival is as vital now as West Berlin was during the Cold War. If they fail to do this, the situation in Israel, Palestine, the Middle East, and the wider Muslim world will be-

come infinitely more perilous. **MR**

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MR Review Essay

Guts and Glory: The American Military Image in Film

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Film and military historian Lawrence H. Suid’s updated version of *Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film* now includes images from the Persian Gulf war and the U.S. intervention in Somalia. Younger readers will be pleased to see that movies such as *Black Hawk Down* (2002) and *Windtalkers* (2002) are now included.¹

Suid’s chronological approach to his anthology highlights the U.S. military in the vicissitudes of Hollywood imagemaking since the film industry’s inception. As such, *Guts and Glory* is a study in cinematic sociology, with ramifications for political science. The book’s content ranges from classic films to lesser-known movies and includes such fantasies as *The Final Countdown* (1980); smarmy flops, such as *Pearl Harbor* (2001); the humorous, such as *Stripes* (1981); assorted millennial and survivalist works; and those that otherwise suffer from “the ambiguity of conflicting images,” such as *Pork Chop Hill* (1959).²

World events often feed the film industry, and Suid discusses the effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the resultant atomic arsenal growth that helped create the American military image. With extended implications for the American mythos, politics and popular sentiment affect the minds of producers and screenwriters. Producers worked closely

with the Pentagon, which provides them scripts for most films—a process that has always been more for material support than spiritual support.

Suid’s analyses have a pleasing balance. He lauds films such as *The Killing Fields* (1984) and *Southern Comfort* (1981) that stand “above the political issues” to let “the visual images of slaughter speak for themselves,” and he addresses issues surrounding whether or not certain films proved effective or interesting, and why others did not.³ Why did *Full Metal Jacket* (1987) become a “strangely detached and uneven movie,” and why did *From Here to Eternity* (1953) prove to be “one of the few Hollywood portrayals of the armed forces that ranks both as a great military film and a great American movie?”⁴

Suid cross-categorizes several movies, such as *Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (1964), a film that exemplifies one of Suid’s major themes—how each military service attempts to help Hollywood repair or enhance its respective image.⁵ In the course of his scrutiny, Suid includes some surprises, such as *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (1977), included because of the Air Force’s staid approach to the existence of unidentified flying objects.⁶ Suid discusses at length the movies depicting and interpreting the Vietnam war,

a study worth a separate book, and John Wayne’s role in military movies warrants two chapters.

A work this broad cannot escape a few criticisms. Suid seems a bit over-determined when he states that Director Stephen Spielberg did a “great disservice to the men he was trying to memorialize” when he produced *Saving Private Ryan*.⁷ Suid also omits the Western genre in its portrayal of Native Americans and Mexicans in conflict with the U.S. Cavalry, although he discusses director John Ford’s productions. Ford made several movies in which racist dynamics were bound up with Cold War politics, such as *Fort Apache* (1948) and *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* (1950).⁸ Finally, Suid could have spoken briefly about how Hollywood movies affect perceptions of America for international audiences.

Still, Suid’s research remains a paradigm of thorough inquiry. He includes a helpful index of over 220 films that he brought into his purview. The appendix delineates Suid’s large number of interviewees, which includes dozens of directors, producers, screenwriters, actors, technical advisers, U.S. military personnel, critics, and studio executives. In the end, Suid believes that Americans likely watch war movies not out of bloodlust, but to enjoy “watching other people challenge death.” This book will likely remain for years to come a major source for

studying Hollywood and the American military image.⁹ **MR**

NOTES

1. Lawrence H. Suid, *Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002); *Black Hawk Down* (Culver City, CA: Columbia Tri-Star DVD, 2003); *Windtalkers* (Burbank, CA: MGM/UA Video DVD, 2002).
2. *The Final Countdown* (Blue Underground DVD, 2004); *Pearl Harbor* (Burbank, CA: Walt Disney Home Video, 2003); *Stripes* (Culver City, CA: Columbia Tri-Star, 2003); *Pork Chop Hill* (Burbank, CA: MGM/UA Studios, 2001).
3. *The Killing Fields* (Burbank, CA: Warner Studios, 2001); *Southern Comfort* (Burbank, CA: MGM/UA, 2001).
4. *Full Metal Jacket* (Burbank, CA: Warner Studios DVD, 2004); *From Here to Eternity* (Culver City, CA: Columbia Tri-Star DVD).
5. *Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (Culver City, CA: Columbia Tri-Star, 2001).

6. *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (Culver City, CA: Columbia Tri-Star DVD, 2001). Suid is also the author of the out-of-print *Scenes of Conflict: Hollywood, the Pentagon, and the Films of the Vietnam Era* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1990). See also William J. Searle's *Search and Clear: Critical Responses to Selected Literature and Films of the Vietnam War* (Madison, WI: Popular Press, 1986).
7. *Saving Private Ryan* (Glendale, CA: Dreamworks SKG DVD, 1999).
8. *Fort Apache* (Turner Home Video DVD, 2003); *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* (Burbank, CA: Warner Studios, DVD, 2002). See also John A. Price, "The Stereotyping of North American Indians in Motion Pictures," *Ethnohistory* 20 (1973): 153-71. To say this genre is freighted with malign realities would be an understatement. Suid only mentions Westerns in passing on the last page of his epilogue. Overall, a wider study is needed of American military films in relation to the intellectual dynamics of modernism.
9. Frank J. Wetta and Martin A. Novelli, "Now a Major Motion Picture": War Films and Hollywood's New Patriotism," *The Journal of Military History* 67 (July 2003): 861-62. Suid falls into the same trap that Wetta and Novelli do in asserting that war's *causaus belli* be included in most, if not all, war movies. (See Suid, 634.) Films, like literature, do not need ontological issues to be effective.

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Islamic Militant Cells and Sadat's Assassination

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President Anwar Sadat selected Egyptian historian and journalist Mousa Sabry to be his official biographer, who received access to Sadat's papers, archives, and declassified information. After Sadat's murder on 6 October 1981 during the 8th anniversary of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, Sabry researched Egyptian presidential archives, interviewed investigators, and poured through thousands of pages of the 1981 Jihad Trial transcripts.¹ The result of Sabry's research is perhaps the most important book written about Sadat—*Al-Sadat Al-Haqiqi Wa Al-Astura* (Sadat, the truth and his legacy).² Sabry also had the rare opportunity of recording Sadat's secret meetings, including the 1972-1973 strategic discussions with higher security council on the need to wage war to enable the Sinai's return to Egypt and to open the Suez Canal.

Since becoming president in 1970, Sadat had lived in fear of being assassinated. He spent his first year thwarting a coup attempt by Ali Sabry (no relation to the author), who thought Sadat was only a temporary substitute for President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Traveling to Israel for peace talks in November 1977 made Sadat even more of a target for assassination. Sadat's security agents revealed that 14 different groups wanted Sadat killed, including Palestinian factions; Marxist organizations,

inside and outside Egypt; and the rejectionist governments of Libya, South Yemen, Iran, and Syria, who abhorred Sadat's decision to have peace talks with Israel. Between 1977 and 1981, security forces foiled 38 attempts to kill Sadat or his ministers and thwarted a coup attempt in Egypt.

Sabry describes four assassination attempts that were eerily similar to the tactics of Ahmed Ramzi Youssef (presently serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) and shoe bomber Richard Reid. Those tactics included immersing plastic and cotton explosive chemicals to mold bombs to place inside shoes and radios.

On 1 May 1981, a Palestinian carrying a cassette radio device packed with five kilograms of explosives attempted to detonate the device after entering the Egyptian radio and television headquarters where Sadat was giving a speech. In 1979, a Lebanese terrorist attempted to assassinate Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali with an attaché case filled with explosives. In late 1979, an Iranian who had been trained to make bombs was apprehended. He was carrying plans designed to create chaos by blowing up gas stations and fuel tankers in and around Cairo.

The accounts of assassination attempts against Sadat include one that those guarding Sadat considered the most dangerous. In September 1981, the Libyans began Operation

Kennedy. Libyan intelligence recruited an Egyptian professional and recent college graduate working in Libya to work for them. He was trained in sharpshooting and became proficient in using a single-shot, bolt-action rifle with a scope. He was flown to Rome to receive further details of the mission. The bolt-action rifle and scope arrived in Rome hidden in the dashboard of a Fiat Model 132, along with poisoned-tipped bullets, rifle parts, and pistols hidden in the vehicle's undercarriage. The Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) and Ministry of Interior had learned of the plan and had followed the assassin from the moment Libyan Intelligence approached him. The plot was quickly neutralized.

Guarding Sadat was a challenge because of his feelings of fatalism and his unwillingness to change his itinerary. He even rode in a small car to the Cairo section of Agozah to enroll his grandson in school. The Egyptian Interior Ministry received bits and pieces of information about a plot to kill Sadat during a visit to Mansoor. The plot turned out to be the final purchase of weapons for the coup that was to follow Sadat's 6 October 1981 assassination.

1981-1984 Jihad Trials

Studying the 1980 Jihad Trial transcripts is an important step toward understanding the jihadist cell that murdered Sadat. The cell had its roots within the military. The transcripts,

which number in the millions of pages, reveal that the Egyptian government (intelligence, presidential guard, and interior ministry) had no knowledge of cell formation in Northern and Southern Egypt. Beginning in early 1980, mass disruption and chaos fomented under the cover of which it could assassinate Sadat.

The cell had weapons caches throughout Egypt and had established revolutionary cells in most districts of the country. It is incredible that Egyptian security missed detecting such a massive undertaking.

Assassination of Sadat

Sadat's assassination, in front of his entire Army, took less than 35 seconds. Egyptian forensic experts have timed the bullets that killed Sadat at 735 meters per second at a distance of less than 15 meters.

The day Sadat was killed, he had four layers of security: personal bodyguards, who were within 15 meters of Sadat; the Republican (Presidential) Guard, a military unit of commandos selected to guard the president, which was stationed outside the 15 meters; the Ministry of Interior and Central Security Services (Amn al-Markazy), which provided rooftop surveillance and roadside security for Sadat's motorcade; and other civilian police and military guards. Despite this redundant security, the assassins were able to get within 15 meters of Sadat.

Parade military units were selected from all over Egypt when conducting the annual parade commemorating the Yom-Kippur War. The units gathered at the central staging area in Cairo and were under the command of an overall commander-in-charge. To ensure that military units participating in the parade were unarmed, Egypt's Department of Military Intelligence's (DMI) required that all live ammunition be surrendered and accounted for, and firing pins were to be removed and secured in an armory. The DMI chief and the Central Military District (CMD) chief were making their annual pilgrimages to Mecca when Sadat was killed.

Cairo and Giza DMI and CMD officials pointed fingers at each other

over the firing-pin controversy. Although required, there was no indication that either had ridden in the parade. It is debatable, however, whether the security guards could have reacted as quickly as the assassins. And, as fate would have it, Sadat asked the only armed guard between him and the assassins to sit down to observe the parade.

Trial documents reveal that Sadat's 150-man Republican Guard, the National Counter-Terrorism Squad, was newly trained, and this was their first job securing a military parade. They positioned themselves in a circle around the reviewing stand instead of beside the president, making it impossible for them to respond to a frontal assault.

All eyes had been fixed on the sky watching the Egyptian air force conduct acrobatics and fly-bys as the five assassins ran toward the reviewing stand, throwing grenades and firing automatic weapons at Sadat. Sadat was sitting exactly parallel and aligned with the tomb of the unknown soldier and, thinking the soldiers were giving him a military tribute, stood up, giving the killers a clear shot. The first shot was fatal, severing a main artery when it entered Sadat's chest. Other bullets penetrated his neck and ribs. His last words were "Mish Maaqool, Mish Maaqool" (impossible, impossible).

Sabry's account differs from that given by Maadi hospital, which reported that Sadat was hit by five bullets and died from severe nervous shock, internal bleeding, and damage to his left lung. Defense Minister Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu-Ghazallah, along with two others who lunged to shield the president were hit by stray bullets.

Mamduh Salim, a member of Sadat's political party, instinctively grabbed Vice President Hosni Mubarak's arm and yelled to members of the cabinet and diplomatic corps to get down. By shielding Mubarak, Salim ensured a peaceful transition of government.

The security team wounded three of the assassins. A fourth escaped but was caught minutes later. The guard assigned to the U.S. ambassador shot at the assailants, and after a brief gun battle, the assassins were

overcome. One was killed; others taken prisoner.

Sadat's killing took the entire Egyptian security organization by surprise, and it was assumed a large military coup would follow. The guards conducted an immediate sweep for explosives and ordered all units that had participated in the military parade to the Central Military District Headquarters to be garrisoned. Ismailiah-Suez Road was closed off, and the Republican Guards and the interior security forces were sent to Cairo to guard radio and television stations.

Senior interior and military officers believed they needed to stimulate a populist uprising, so within hours they deployed troops to—

- The Cairo radio and television headquarters.

- The radio broadcast towers in the Mukatam Hills.

- The homes and offices of ministers.

- The National Assembly offices.

- Giza Governorship Offices.

- Mobile communication vans.

- The Central Command Center, in which the Republican Guard coordinated all deployed forces.

The Minister of Interior immediately executed "Plan 100," a meticulous plan involving securing Cairo and ordering Egypt's police forces to take on a martial posture.

Inside the Assassins' Minds

Why was Sadat assassinated? Sabry used court transcripts and investigative documentation to profile Sadat's assassins and major instigators of the plot. The interrogation and trial of the assassins lasted from 1981 to 1984. One benefit was the copious amount of interview and transcript material that was made public.

Abdul-Salam Abdul-Al. Abdul-Al, an officer in Egyptian Air Defense, was 28-years old in 1981. During his interrogation he said he thought Egyptian society was in a state of munkar (decadence). He saw Sadat as the manifestation of Islamic regression and decided he had to kill him. He discussed how he became aware of Egyptian society's obsession with consumerism, the consumption of alcohol, and an accumu-

lation of interest. He said women who took to the hijab were scorned and that religious scholars who preached the truth were jailed.

Abdul-Al was happy with the results of the 1979 Iranian revolution, where the mullahs toppled the American-supported Shah. However, he felt that the Shiite revolution needed a Sunni counterweight and argued that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was discrediting the Islamic faith. The creation of an Islamic government in Egypt would balance the religious influence of Iran. He translated Abd al-Halim bin Taymiyyah's 13th-century writings, which stated that the Tartars had declared themselves Muslims and pledged to rule with Islamic law but, instead, applied their own indigenous Yasiq laws.³ They built mosques and Islamic schools while also suppressing Islamic thought.

Abdul-Al's stint in the armed forces gave him the time, interaction, and ability to develop his theories about Islam. He met like-minded soldiers who believed they were serving an infidel government, and they felt their guilt feelings had to be purged. They could use their combat skills to foment a violent revolution. They used verses from the *Quran* and prophet Muhammad's writings to apply Muhammad's war of self-preservation against those who were trying to destroy his teachings. The group applied Muhammad's writings out of context to condemn Sadat and his regime.

During his interrogation, Abdul-Al revealed that no inspection of firing pins or rounds had been conducted the day of the parade, making it incredibly simple to bring a loaded weapon to the pass and review. The only inspection that had been conducted was a random one by the Republican Guard of the 333d Brigade after the afternoon prayers, which was hours before the parade was to begin. The interrogation ended with Abdul-Al describing how he fired on Sadat at a 20-degree angle. He did not aim but opened up on full automatic in the general direction of the VIP reviewing stand.

Atta Tayel Hameeda. Hameeda, a combat engineer and Alexandria University mechanical engineering grad-

uate, was 26 years old in 1981. Like Abdul-Al, he espoused justification for Sadat's killing because he felt Sadat was not ruling according to Islamic law. He compared Sadat to a pharaoh who had gone astray and believed he was a living God. Hameeda believed Sadat and the Egyptian government were attempting to secularize society and separate God from the state because Egypt's National Assembly used democracy as a mandate to ignore what was allowed under God's laws. Discos, the use of alcohol, and movies were examples of how the people's will had overtaken God's law in the legislature. His strict, fundamentalist view of Islam was even stricter than what the Prophet Muhammad practiced in Medina in 622.

Hameeda's desire was not only to kill Sadat, but to also kill Interior Minister Nabawy Ismail so Hameeda could establish an Islamic government. When asked if killing the president was enough to establish an Islamic government, he responded that he acted on God's orders and that God alone was responsible for establishing and ruling an Islamic government.⁴

When interrogators cited verses from the *Quran* about tolerance, Hameeda responded with other verses he felt supported his right to kill Sadat. Hameeda was steeped in Salafist-Wahabi doctrine. When asked what books influenced him, he named the major Islamic texts, including *Ibn Katheer*, *Al-Qurtoobi*, *Ibn Al-Qaim Al-Jawzeaa*, and *Ibn Taymiyyah*, all of which purported that Islamic purification had to be undertaken through violence.⁵

Hussein Abbas Muhammad. Muhammad, a sergeant in the civil defense force, was the only assassin captured away from the reviewing stand. He was 28 years old. None of the assassins referred to Sadat by name. They called him the oppressor, the pharaoh, or the president. Muhammad began his interrogation by stating that he was a martyr for killing the oppressor. When asked to describe in detail how he executed the crime, he responded that he objected to the word "crime" and that he preferred the word "killing" of the Zalim (oppressor).

Unlike the others, Muhammad was robotic when he explained that his target was Sadat, and he felt no remorse about shooting anyone who got in his way. He justified killing Sadat because he believed Sadat, with his Central Security Services, had waged war on the Muslims. He said Sadat had referred to women's hijabs as tents and that Sadat had raided many mosques arresting those within. He said Sadat had arrested women and attempted to separate religion from state.

Unlike those who had read Islamic radical commentaries, Muhammad had been influenced by clerics he had heard on cassette tapes and through appearances in Cairo mosques. He held in reverence the clerics who were imprisoned because of their ideals, including Sheikhs Al-Mehlawi, Salamah, Al-Badry, Kishk, Saleh, Al-Samawy, and Muslim Brotherhood leader Omar Al-Tilmissany. He revealed that 1st Lieutenant Khalid Islambooli had been the team leader.

Khalid Mohammed Shawky Islambooli. Islambooli, a 24-year-old Egyptian Army 1st Lieutenant, was not initially scheduled to participate in the 6 October parade, but on 23 September, his executive officer Major Makram Abdul-Al assigned him to attend. Islambooli had 13 days to plan the assassination. His advantage was that he had participated in the 1979 and 1980 6 October parades. He knew the parade's procedures, was under no suspicion, and was considered reliable because of his participation in previous reviews.

Islambooli's religious justification to strike at the Egyptian government for its ungodly policies and decadence came from cleric Ali Muhammad Abdul-Salam.⁶ Islambooli had also been reading Al-Mawdudi, Bin Taymiyyah, and pamphlets on jihad. He drew comparisons between democracy and the Yasiq laws of the Tartars as being man-made laws that were overshadowing God's laws.

Islambooli delineated between mosques that he felt were Al-Ukhwa mosques and those he considered brethren. When asked how he knew which mosque was a brethren one, he said it was simple—by the way they dressed. They wore ankle-

length shirts, beards, and prayers were etched on their faces. Islambooli indicated that Abdul-Salam's ministry guided him toward martyrdom and that his transformation took 18 months.

Like his followers, Islambooli saw Sadat as an infidel who had abandoned divine law and oppressed the people. When confronted with the fact that Sadat was the first Egyptian leader to introduce a constitutional amendment requiring Islamic law to be the source of all legislation, Islambooli dismissed this as a political charade.

When asked about his firing pin, he stated that the evening before the military parade his battalion leader verbally warned everyone to remove their firing pins and give them to their company leaders. Islambooli carried out the order and collected the firing pins, however, the collection procedures were not followed and Islambooli kept the pins.

Lieutenant Colonel Mamdouh Mihrim Husni Abu Jebel. Abu Jebel, of the 2d Egyptian Army Engineers, declared that he converted to Islamic militancy in the 1970s. He had read many of the same works as the others and had listened to the same sermons by fiery and politicized clerics. Abu Jebel became involved with Mohammed Adel Salam Faraj, a fellow officer who led a failed revolt against Sadat at the Military Technical Academy. Faraj was well known for his book *Al-Farida Al-Ghaiba* (The missing obligation), which became the manual for organizing armed Islamic militant vanguards.⁷

Mohammed Adel Salam Faraj. Faraj was found guilty of leading an insurrection and being part of the assassination plot. The assassination planning took place at Faraj's home, and it was Faraj who told Abu Jebel and Abdul-Latif (Abood) Al-Zummur that military and security personnel were to be recruited before civilians.

Islamic militant cells, directed by Faraj and Al-Zummur, did not exceed seven persons per cell. A cell leader would be in contact with a central planner. Assassination and overthrow cells were developed in the Cairo districts of Shubra, Abdeen, Quba Bridge, and Alexandria. The cells

had recruited a handful of sailors into the workshops, and the Egyptian Navy was prepared to smuggle terrorists out of Alexandria. Three hundred persons connected with the cells were discovered in Cairo, Asyut, and El-Minia, and major concentrations of Al-Jihad cells were located in the Cairo slums of Bulaq.

Lieutenant Colonel Abdul-Latif (Abood) Al-Zummur. Al-Zummur, an Egyptian Military Intelligence officer, was 35 years old. His reason for killing Sadat was part of a bigger plan to create an uprising in Egypt's capital and three other major cities. He told investigators that he had met Faraj in August 1980 and had spent a year immersed in ideological discussions and readings to define his position on (violent) jihad. Faraj had given him a copy of his booklet, "The Missing Obligation," and they discussed the mechanics of how to foment a violent revolution within the Egyptian military.⁸ Although Al-Zummur was steeped in ideology, he was a tactical planner at heart.

Al-Zummur's confession showed a detailed level of sophisticated planning. To ensure a successful coup attempt, the plan included several key locations including the buildings of the Ministry of Defense, Cairo Television and Radio stations, the Central Security headquarters, and the Ministry of Interior.

Al-Zummur explained how killing the minister of the interior, the defense and foreign affairs minister, and the head of Central Security would send the command and control structure into chaos. He indicated that killing Sadat while he was in the reviewing stand was vital because Sadat would be surrounded by his key ministers and officials whose deaths would disable the Egyptian government. He also advocated the simultaneous killing of communist leader Khalid Moihiddin to eliminate any chance for a leftist takeover. Al-Zummur had planned to inform the public of a new Islamic government in Egypt during the chaos.

Al-Zummur formed a majlis alshura consisting of himself, Al-Maghribi, and Faraj. Their tasks were to be divided as follows:

- Faraj would handle recruitment through ideology.

- Al-Maghribi would handle the training of recruits in topography, martial arts, security procedures, and weapons training.

- Al-Zummur would handle popular uprising tactics and the targeting of key leaders for assassination.

The terrorists robbed Coptic Christian jewelers to help finance their operations. Al-Zummur monitored the movement of politically active communists and Christian leaders because he was concerned that they would use the chaos to foment a separate insurgency. Cleric Omar Abdul Rahman (in U.S. custody since 1993 for the World Trade Center bombing) was responsible for issuing the fatwa (religious sanction) that allowed the attack on Coptic Christian jewelers and authorized the killing of Egyptian political leaders.

Al-Zummur, who was using non-commissioned officers sympathetic to his cause, detailed his plans of a raid on the armory at Al-Maza Air Base. He told of a plan to set in motion an elaborate media campaign by using underground pamphlets and audio cassette tapes to announce the coming of an Islamic revolt.

Following Sadat's assassinations, the following items were found in Al-Zummur's apartment:

- Codebooks used to send encrypted communications to various cells throughout Egypt.

- A copy of Khomeini's 1963 book, *Islamic Governance*.⁹

- Press clippings that detailed the movements of Egypt's major National Democratic Party figures, which enabled him to predict the movement of Egyptian parliamentarians and ministers.

- A listing of noncommissioned officers and 1st lieutenants, who Al-Zummur could use as operatives or rely on to carry out unquestioned orders.

- Eleven cassette tapes of Islamic clerical speeches by Abdul-Hameed Kishk and Salah Abu Ismail.

- Twenty-three texts on Islamic fundamentalist theories by Islamic militant ideologues.

- A copy of Mao Tse Tsung's book on guerrilla warfare.

- Pamphlets fomenting violent revolutions and civil disorder.

- Texts on martial arts.

□ A collection of Israeli, Soviet-made, and local weapons.

Religious Clashes

In June 1981, government forces cracked down on Christian and Muslim violence. The assassins saw the religious clashes as a sign that they were to violently overthrow the government and to reestablish the Lord's laws. Faraj viewed Egypt's Christians as plotting to establish a separate state in the Southern Egyptian province of Qina and looked on their collection plates as a means of financing their vision. To him Christian evangelism was a threat to Islam. He labeled any Muslim who did not agree with his vision as a munafiqoon (hypocrite).

Today, Faraj's book still offers important ideology, as does the works of Sayyid Qutb, Bin Taymiyyah, and al-Qaeda ideologues. Ayman Al-Zawahiri's volumes on 21st-Century

Islamic militancy are discredited by fellow Arabs and Muslims as a perverted and intolerant version of Islamic history.

The transcripts offer the means, methods, and ways in which militants have created armed terrorists cells. Although the Islamists failed in their coup attempt in Egypt, they are persistent and will try again. **MR**

NOTES

1. The transcripts tell much about the Islamic militant mindset and should be analyzed by military and law enforcement officials who are fighting the war on terrorism.
2. Mousa Sabry, *Al-Sadat Al-Haqiqah Wa Al-Astura* (Sadat, the truth and his legacy) (Cairo: Modern Egyptian Library, 1985).
3. Taqi Bin Taymiyyah's *Al-Siyasa Al-Shariyah* (The Perfect Polity) is a central focus of Wahhabism and also the core ideology of Islamic militant groups including al-Qaeda. The text excommunicates those Muslims who are not ruling according to God's Laws and stipulates that it is up to the religious establishment to determine who is worthy of ruling Muslims.
4. The term "Islamic government" is a nebulous concept. The words of Muhammad and the *Quran* offer little in telling Muslims how they should govern themselves. On Muhammad's death, the Muslims reverted to the pre-Islamic concept of the caliphate, in which elders gathered and a consensus was reached among tribes on a singular leader. Many Muslims confuse the yearning for fair, honest, and representative governance with Islamic government. What many want is a ruler who rules with mor-

als and not one that oppresses, robs the nation of resources, or neglects the social welfare of the population.

5. Publishing information not available.

6. The idea of condemning Egyptian society and government as being in a state of apostasy was articulated in the early 1960s by radical Egyptian theorist Sayid Qutb who was hanged by Nasser in 1966 and whose booklet *Maalim fee Al-Tareeq* (Guideposts along the road) is a staple of Islamic militant theory today.

7. See Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, "Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood," *Military Review* (Jul-Aug 2003): 26-31, for more information.

8. Mohammed Adel Salam Faraj, *Al-Farida Al-Ghaiba* (The missing obligation) (publisher unknown).

9. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islamic Governance* (publisher not given).

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MR Book Reviews

TRUMAN'S DILEMMA: Invasion or The Bomb, Paul D. Walker, Pelican Pub. Co., Gretna, LA, 2003, 267 pages, \$19.95.

If you believe that President Harry S. Truman made the right decision to drop nuclear weapons on Japan, this book will supply grist for your mill. If you feel that an invasion or blockade was an alternative, you might reconsider your opinion after reading this book.

A considerable part of *Truman's Dilemma: Invasion or The Bomb* deals with the philosophical and psychological mindsets of the Japanese toward defeat and surrender. Walker carefully develops the background of mid-20th-century Japanese perspectives and then shows how these attitudes translate into military operations, governance of conquered territories, and treatment of prisoners of war. Walker's descriptions of various battles and campaigns detail the Allies' problems caused by the fight-to-the-death dedication of Japanese military personnel and of Japanese civilians who actively

fought with the army when defeat seemed imminent.

Walker faults General Douglas MacArthur with poor planning in the Philippines, decrying what seemed to be "a complete lack of coordination between the army and navy on defensive strategies." Walker suggests that America's early problems in the Philippines had buoyed Japan's sense of invincibility.

The assumed high number of American casualties resulting from an invasion of Japan was a prime factor in Truman's decision to use nuclear weapons. Walker discusses how casualty calculations were achieved and why they were probably lower than they would have been if the United States had invaded Japan.

The book has a few shortcomings. Walker could have given less attention to matters not directly relating to Truman's decision—Japan's 1906 annexation of Korea and the B-29 bomber's strengths and weaknesses, for example. He also does not address Japan's brutal treatment of

the Koreans throughout the war. However, this informative, stimulating book carefully assembles the factors that Truman considered while making one of the most difficult decisions in history. Walker gives the reader a foundation on which to evaluate similar future situations. I highly recommend this well-written book.

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Retired, Niceville, Florida

ONE DAMN BLUNDER FROM BEGINNING TO END: The Red River Campaign of 1864, Gary Dillard Joiner, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE, 2002, 198 pages, \$65.00.

During my initial research to develop a staff ride handbook of Nathaniel P. Banks's 1864 Red River Campaign in Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, I found only one book about the campaign: Ludwell Johnson's *Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War* (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1958). While Johnson's book was good, it was dated and devoted

nearly one-fourth of its pages to the effect cotton had on the of the campaign's political origins. The maps were poor and did little to help the reader visualize what happened during the battles of this campaign.

Later, I found Gary Dillard Joiner's *One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End*, which put a fresh face on this little-known campaign. Joiner writes without the much-overused hype of modern Civil War writers—claiming that every battle was decisive. Joiner provides Civil War historians and military professionals a straightforward, valuable account of the Red River Campaign. Joiner's maps, although lacking in detail, are a great improvement over previous maps.

Joiner's new revelations about the Red River Campaign put a different perspective on the causes of key events. For example, he posits that the Confederates made a successful attempt to divert water from the Red River through Tone's Bayou into Bayou Pierre. And, although Admiral David D. Porter's problems have been thought to be the result of low rainfall, Joiner convincingly argues that the fleet's problems were due as much to deliberate efforts on the part of Southern engineers to hamper the U.S. Navy's operations as on the lack of rain.

Four *Hunley*-like submarines were being constructed in Shreveport and perhaps four or five small *Arkansas*-like ironclads were there as well. After discussing Porter's naval experience and efforts to monitor the depth of the river, Joiner explains that the admiral's fear of the Confederate ships prompted him to lead the fleet upriver toward Shreveport with the U.S.S. *Eastport*, the largest ironclad in the fleet, as the flagship. Porter eventually lost the ironclad, not to enemy warships, but to the difficulties of navigating the Red River. Porter's decision hampered the Navy's efforts and almost led to a substantial loss to the fleet.

One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End is useful to military professionals as a modern overview of the Red River Campaign and is especially useful for its analysis of personalities in joint operations; its studies of military objectives clouded by political and other nonmilitary con-

cerns; the dynamics of integrating units used to various operating procedures; and the study of military engineering in terms of ad-hoc solutions to military problems. I strongly recommend the book to serious students of the Civil War.

LTC Steven E. Clay, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TO AMERICA: Personal Reflections of an Historian, Stephen E. Ambrose, Simon and Schuster Paperback, New York, 2003, 265 pages, \$14.00.

Stephen Ambrose was a great storyteller. He was loud, pugnacious, occasionally profane, loved life, loved America, and loved regaling his audiences with his knowledge of America's history. *To America: Personal Reflections of an Historian* was completed just before Ambrose's death in 2002.

The book is a highly personal rendering of America's story from the time of the Founding Fathers to the present day. Ambrose's retelling of over 200 years of American history draws almost exclusively from his own literary output.

The book has virtues and faults similar to those found in Ambrose's previous books, but he was learned, witty, defiantly politically incorrect, and wrote and spoke plainly and bluntly. At the same time, *To America* is sloppily edited and facts are poorly checked. For example, President Theodore Roosevelt and son Theodore, Jr., are not the only father-son Medal of Honor recipients; that group also includes General Douglas MacArthur and his son Arthur.

The book contains too many simplistic, vaguely embarrassing assertions and unsupported declarations, a failing that has plagued Ambrose's late work and caused some readers to squirm. For instance, the U.S. Marines are "The Best Damn Fighting Men in the World!" and "Our greatest strength is that American kids are brought up to know right from wrong." There is no evidence here of the plagiarism that fouled his book, *The Wild Blue: The Men and Boys Who Flew the F-24's Over Germany 1944-45* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2001), but essentially, he has plagiarized himself in book after book by repeating his ceaseless paeans to

the "greatest generation," "citizen soldiers," and "the American Spirit."

Although his books have often topped the bestseller lists, many scholars dismissed Ambrose as a mere "popular" historian. But he did not simply "dumb down" his history or focus on narrative to the exclusion of analysis. Early in his career he produced important biographies of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon, and he authored a respected textbook on U.S. foreign policy. As he matured, Ambrose shed some of the academic's natural cynicism and became enamored of ordinary Americans like Major Dick Winters in *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle Nest* (Touchstone Books, New York, 2d ed., 2001), whose courage, determination, and innate decency he admired.

To America's most engaging passages are Ambrose's descriptions of his encounters and adventures in the course of researching his books—following in the footsteps of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark; driving a locomotive over the Sierra Nevada while learning about the transcontinental railroad; participating in Native American ceremonies on a reservation in South Dakota; and gaining an appreciation for the terrain of dozens of battlefields from New Orleans to Normandy.

What leaps out from this farewell book is his great faith in democracy and his fellow citizens. Countless readers loved Stephen Ambrose, and as he says about his countrymen in his final book, "The people, as they almost always are, were right."

COL Alan Cate, USA,
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THE SEEDS OF TERROR: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia, Maria Ressa, Free Press, New York, 2003, 272 pages, \$26.00.

Maria Ressa tells the real story of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Few journalists and, for that matter, few military and intelligence professionals are as qualified to assess the threats in Southeast Asia as Ressa is.

Ressa has fused information and analysis from many sources through-

out Southeast Asia that are superior to those that intelligence services provide. Her access to high-level sources in and out of governments in the region and the trust she has established with many well-connected civilians from all walks of life allowed her to piece together the complex mosaic of how al-Qaeda has emerged as the overarching threat in Southeast Asia.

One of the book's most valuable contributions is Ressa's assessment of the West's weaknesses, which if not understood and addressed will allow al-Qaeda to continue to operate and expand its influence and connections within other terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah, the Abu Sayyef Group, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

While the world focuses on the counterterrorism aspect of the Global War on Terrorism, Ressa understands that it must be viewed as an insurgency on a global scale and that the West must do a better job of fighting ideology with ideology. Law enforcement and tactical military operations will not be enough to defeat this threat.

At the center of counterefforts to control al-Qaeda are the moderate Muslims of the world. The West must embrace them and ask them to help support efforts to eradicate the radical elements of their religion who are perverting the Islamic faith for their own power and ideals.

We have much to fear from al-Qaeda, whose manual states that Islamic governments "are established . . . by pen and gun, by word and bullet. . . ." Mao Zedong also believed that power grew out of the barrel of a gun, but because of the superiority of the ideology of freedom and self-determination, communism is being discredited and neutralized around the world. Ressa implies, but does not ask the question, "Can the West use the same skills and have the same determination and patience in defeating al-Qaeda as it did to defeat communism?"

Every military officer and government official who has a role in the Global War on Terrorism should read Ressa's book.

LTC David S. Maxwell, USA,
Washington, D.C.

THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, David S. Landes, 2d ed., Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, 576 pages, \$75.00.

For over 30 years *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* has been the basic text about the Industrial Revolution—the pivotal development that allowed Western Europe to dominate the world economically, militarily, and politically for centuries.

David S. Landes emphasizes entrepreneurial spirit and freedom to experiment as the key to why the Industrial Revolution occurred first in Europe. Also, size mattered, for although the small island nation of England had few natural resources, it did have transportation networks and easy access to ports through which to import needed materials. Also, English entrepreneurs were imaginative, creative, and willing to change, which resulted in one small innovation after another. Incremental change over time built the revolution that gave England the edge, then the dominant position. French culture, geography, and government centralization delayed French industrialization, but England's loss of entrepreneurial spirit and risk-taking allowed Germany to catch up late in the 19th century.

This book, which has been in print continually since it was first published in 1969, is a magnificent economic history, so why is there a second edition? When Landes first presented his mass of material, economic history was moving away from his narrative-style approach to one using raw data and econometrics. However, economic history withstood the number-crunching cliometricians, and the narrative style is back in vogue. Events that have occurred in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, which the original book did not address, are included in the second edition.

Landes sees little prospect of Euro-American hegemony diminishing except in China and India. For technologically backward nations, only increased knowledge and mate-

rial growth will reduce the ills of the early 21st century—that and a turn toward the entrepreneurial spirit of acquisitiveness, aggressiveness, hard work, and determination. According to Landes, the world must take on European values, adapt them, and mold them to local conditions, which might keep the technological revolution moving and material exploitation growing.

Landes's second edition might have benefited from more current material; however, it is still an unbeatable introduction to the economic history of the industrial and technological revolutions in Western Europe.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Yukon, Oklahoma

DYNAMO: Triumph and Tragedy in Nazi-Occupied Kiev, Andy Dougan, The Lyons Press, Guilford, CT, 2002, 241 pages, \$29.95.

In 1981 Sylvester Stallone, Michael Caine, and Pelé, appeared in the movie *Victory* (Warner DVD, Burbank, CA, 2004). The movie's plot revolves around a group of Allied soldiers in a World War II German prisoner of war camp. When the Allied soldiers play a select German team in a soccer match, they not only win, they escape en masse. Andy Dougan's book *Dynamo: Triumph and Tragedy in Nazi-Occupied Kiev* relates a similar story from the Eastern Front. While Dougan's book is similar to the Hollywood story, two major differences are apparent: Dougan's account is factual, and it has no Hollywood ending.

In the decade before World War II, Dynamo Kiev gained a reputation as one of the strongest and most capable soccer teams in the Soviet Union, if not in all of Europe. The war scattered the team, and some members were encircled in Kiev and captured by the Germans in late summer 1941. The remaining members were reunited through the efforts of football-loving bakery owner and team goalie Nikolai Trusevich.

The German occupiers, attempting to return the city to some semblance of normalcy, organized a local soccer league, and, Dynamo Kiev quickly established itself as the team to beat.

They played an all-German soccer team and won, which shattered the competition's benign nature. Local German leaders, wanting to reestablish the notion of Eastern Slavic racial inferiority, assembled another team and promoted a final match. The ugly outcome ended the wartime soccer exploits of Dynamo Kiev.

Dougan, a journalist from the *Glasgow Evening Times*, does not attempt to be a historian; he merely tries to relate Dynamo Kiev's story. The details about the events of the summer of 1942 are obscured by time and conflict and are transformed into myth and urban legend. Dougan recognizes the limits of oral histories and the inconsistencies that pepper the story, and he does not jump to conclusions or connections that are not present. What emerges is a well-told story about a group of men in a difficult situation.

In some cases, Dougan's level of detail about soccer might exceed the average American's familiarity with the sport; however, it is not a distraction from his overall work. *Dynamo* tells a compelling story of the importance of sport to a national identity. This excellent book will appeal to military historians and sports fans alike.

**MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany**

A GRATEFUL HEART: The History of a World War I Field Hospital, Michael E. Shay, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2002, 237 pages, \$62.00.

Michael E. Shay, a Superior Court Judge from Connecticut, does a fine job with *A Grateful Heart: The History of a World War I Field Hospital*. His interest in World War I medicine began as a young boy when he visited his grandparents' home and discovered pieces of his grandfather's uniform. His grandmother told him that his, "grandfather was 'like' a doctor in the Army." This began Shay's study of World War I and, especially, his grandfather's unit—the 26th "Yankee" Division, National Guard, 101st Sanitary Train.

Shay researched and examined all aspects of the unit from the organization of four ambulance and four hospital companies from Connecti-

cut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to its accomplishments in combat. The story begins with the division's formation in New England in the volunteering spirit of the "Minute Man" and progresses through stateside pre-deployment activities. Because of efforts by Major General Clarence R. Edwards, who was the division commander and an 1883 graduate of West Point, the division became the first National Guard Division in France.

After arriving in France in November 1917, the soldiers were introduced to army expeditionary camp life with its plethora of camp illnesses caused by cold and wet weather—colds, influenza, trench foot, and bronchitis. The group first saw combat in February 1918 under the command of the French Army's 11th Corps. Shay devotes several chapters to major offensives in which the 101st Sanitary Train participated—Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne. The group continued making its hospitals more mobile as they moved closer to the front and augmented their hospitals with surgical teams.

In March 1919, 1 year and 5 months after they left the United States and 4 months after the armistice, the soldiers of the 101st Sanitary Train began coming home. The unit gained much recognition for its valor and accomplishments. Of the 50 officers and over one thousand enlisted men, the unit suffered 155 casualties and 19 deaths. Seven soldiers were captured and became prisoners of war after refusing to abandon their wounded at Seicheprey. The men of the 101st Sanitary Train received 8 Croix de Guerre (one with palm), 7 Distinguished Service Crosses, and 147 other awards for valor. The unit itself received 22 citations from either French or American armies or both.

A Grateful Heart describes how a nation, unprepared for war, sent unhealthy and unprepared soldiers into combat. The same issues that were argued in 1918 are being argued today—that National Guard soldiers are not as prepared for combat as active components are. Shay loyally describes the 101st Sanitary Train

soldiers as inferior to *no* soldier.

A Grateful Heart, a major contribution to detailing World War I medicine, provides remarkable insight into the specific problems and challenges of military medicine. This book will be of most value to members of medical detachments, but readers of World War I history will also find it interesting.

**COL Robert S. Driscoll, USA,
Walter Reed Army Medical Center,
Washington, D.C.**

TO HELL WITH HONOR: Custer and the Little Bighorn, Larry Sklenar, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2003, 416 pages, \$19.95.

Larry Sklenar's *To Hell with Honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn* is a thought-provoking and intensely researched historical work. Sklenar provides tremendous detail about the composition, organization, equipment, and personalities of the 7th Cavalry. The smooth-flowing text quickly engrosses the reader, although the book might be best-suited for those well-versed in Custer lore.

Sklenar places blame for the Little Bighorn debacle on Major Marcus Reno, describing Reno as a novice, a drunk, and lacking leadership. Sklenar does not mention that Reno personally led an attack to protect Lieutenant MacIntosh's flank in the timber, and he ignores the effect Mary Hannah Reno's death in 1874 had on Reno while he was in charge of the U.S.-Canadian Boundary Survey.

Sklenar's research is extensive, but not exhaustive. He completely ignores *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1897), which documents Reno's campaign against the Umatilla Indians and the close relationship Custer had with Reno during the Civil War. Sklenar freely mixes quotes from novels, such as Evan S. Connell's *Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Bighorn* (North Pointe Press, New York, 1997) and misrepresents them as historical facts. Sklenar's factual errors place Custer south of Reno, when Custer was actually east-northeast of

Reno's position.

To appreciate Sklenar's work and its relevance to current irregular warfare, I recommend reading the following books in the order below:

▣ John S. Gray, *Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876* (The Old Army Press, Fort Collins, CO, 1976), which is the best account of the campaign.

▣ Ronald H. Nichols, ed., *Reno Court of Inquiry: Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the Case of Major Marcus A. Reno* (Custer Battlefield Historical and Museum Association, Garryowen, MT, 1992).

▣ Sklenar, *To Hell with Honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn*.

▣ Nichols, *In Custer's Shadow: Major Marcus Reno* (The Old Army Press, Fort Collins, CO, 1999).

LTC Dennis K. Clark, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BEYOND BAGHDAD: Postmodern War and Peace, Ralph Peters, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2003, 368 pages, \$22.95.

Ralph Peters' *Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace* is the contemporary companion to his two earlier books, *Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World* (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2002), and *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph* (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1999). This book, which picks up where the others left off, includes a series of essays and editorials from the pre-11 September 2001 to the post-Operation Iraqi Freedom period.

Peters divides the book into two sections, "Our Future" and "Our Wars." In "Our Future" he offers an incisive, provocative, and highly optimistic series of opinions and viewpoints. His analysis is not politically correct. He pulls no punches and spares no scared cows.

Peters' observations are closely tied to those of international affairs and travel author Robert Kaplan. Like Kaplan, Peters believes that the world of the terrorist is the world of frustrated failure. He agrees with fellow analyst Samuel Huntington that a clash of cultures exists, although Peters frames the competing cultures differently and agrees with fellow regional observer Bernard Lewis that

the Muslim world is blaming the West for its own dismal economic and political failures. In short, terrorists favor fundamentalism and a retreat to the past to escape the reality of the Arab inability to compete in the modern world.

Peters describes the terrorists' motivations and advocates their destruction because they are incapable of negotiating. His uncompromising assessment is well reasoned and not without a positive side. He highlights successful Muslim nations and emphasizes the criticality of their continued success. He believes it is possible for the Islamic world to adapt, compete, and embrace modernity.

In "Our Wars," Peters discusses Operation Iraqi Freedom, excoriating those who look for defeat and who call every minor setback a slippery slope to a Vietnamesque quagmire. As a Coalition Forces plans officer and commander during the war, I wish I would have had access to Peters' editorials just to know that there were voices of reason who understood the nature of warfare. Peters offers an optimistic view of ultimate victory if we can only maintain a sense of perspective.

Peters provides a coherent, insightful, and hard-hitting perspective. His confidence in America as a historic and unstoppable engine of change is refreshing and infectious. Peters comes to grips with the mind of the enemy and the timidity of the press and of Germany and France—our erstwhile Allies. His message that we will prevail is refreshing and all too rare today. An engaging page-turner, the book provides useful analysis and opinions for anyone engaged in the Global War on Terrorism.

LTC John R. Sutherland, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ANTICIPATING SURPRISE: Analysis for Strategic Warning, Cynthia M. Grabo, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, 2002, 175 pages, price not available.

In March 2001, in a short paper for a class at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, I wrote that American leaders are likely to awaken one day to the shock of a surprise attack. The professor affixed a short

note to my paper asking if I really believed this. Six months later, no one thought to ask such a question.

Cynthia M. Grabo's *Anticipating Surprise* affirms my dismal conclusion. Updated from the still-classified original written 30 years ago, this book is intended as an introduction to the role of strategic warning in intelligence. As the subtitle suggests, the book is about strategic, not tactical, warning, although Grabo does discuss tactical surprise. She says that tactical warning is primarily the concern of military units, not intelligence agencies. Thus, the intended audience for this book is intelligence analysts and the policy-makers they support.

Much of the book is too detailed to keep the interest of a general audience, but a careful reading of *Anticipating Surprise* will more than repay the effort. Intelligence insider Grabo knows from experience the problems of intelligence analysis and has some ideas about how to fix them. Grabo worked for nearly 40 years as an analyst and researcher for the Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The focus of the book is on national governments, not nonstate actors. During the Global War on Terrorism and crises on the Korean peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, and South Asia have the potential to be far more deadly than the operations of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Because conflicts in these areas are likely to involve the United States and because the Chinese have spoken openly about their intent to achieve surprise, Grabo's words are worth studying. However, given significant differences in how state and nonstate actors operate and the current U.S. effort against the latter, a discussion about warning of nonstate attacks would have been useful.

Grabo carefully pulls together the military and political aspects of strategic warning and reminds her readers that politics provides the context for interpreting military actions. She discusses the differences (and tensions between) current, order of battle, and indications intelligence. Grabo values the technical collection resources available to U.S. intelligence,

but cautions that they are limited in what they can tell the analyst. Technical intelligence's downside is that it can lead to information overload during a crisis.

Grabo warns against expecting too much precision in analytical conclusions. It is much easier to predict that an enemy will attack, she writes, than it is to predict when the attack will begin. She points out that recent strategic surprise has been successful because indications were misread or ignored, not because there were no indications.

I have two reservations about the book. First, it will be of limited value unless it provokes analysts and policymakers to develop increased mental agility and be more open to the unexpected. Surprise depends as much on self-deception as it does on the enemy's actions. Second, Grabo should expand her brief discussion of the importance of understanding our adversaries, particularly the difficulty Americans have with this.

The book also needs to address cross-cultural issues. Our future enemies are more likely to be dissimilar to us than similar, to understand Sun Tzu better than Carl von Clausewitz, and to show little regard for the laws of war. Military action will be but one aspect of a multidimensional strategy. Tactical surprise will be common and strategic surprise possible. In a world where the United States is the sole superpower, surprise is the only thing that gives our adversaries a fighting chance.

CH (COL) Douglas McCready,
ARNG, Dexheim, Germany

BEYOND GLORY: Medal of Honor Heroes in Their Own Words, Larry Smith, W.W. Norton, New York, 2003, 320 pages, \$26.95.

The Medal of Honor was established in 1862 and only 3,410 individuals have received it, many of those posthumously. Today, there are approximately 140 living recipients from World Wars I and II and the Vietnam war.

Veteran editor and journalist Larry Smith, formerly with the *New York Times* and *Parade*, interviewed several Medal of Honor recipients and put together 24 firsthand accounts

from Pearl Harbor to the bloody battlefields of Vietnam. Smith has interviewed a cross section of those who received America's highest honor: officers and enlisted men; African-Americans; Japanese-Americans; Hispanics and Caucasians; the famous and not so famous. His list includes former U.S. Senators Daniel Inouye and Bob Kerrey and lesser known recipients like Rodolfo Hernandez of Colton, California, who on 31 May 1951, singlehandedly broke up an enemy attack near Wontong-ni, Korea, being grievously wounded in the process.

Sacrifice and duty are common themes of these stories. The recipients made the ultimate commitment to country and buddies. They modestly claim they are not special; however, their deeds were clearly special—above and beyond the call of duty—in dangerous, life-threatening situations. They all insist they were not Medal of Honor “winners” but merely “recipients” of the medal representing those with whom they served.

Smith provides a brief scene-setting narrative that puts each Medal of Honor recipient's actions in historical context. He then lets each soldier tell his story in his own words. The stories reveal how seemingly ordinary men rise to accomplish extraordinary, often almost superhuman, feats in combat.

The Medal of Honor recipient's photos and citations accompany each interview. Pulitzer Prize-winning photojournalist Eddie Adams, who took the famous photo of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing a Viet Cong suspect in the head during the 1968 Tet Offensive, took the photographs.

Although the book does not contain much in-depth analysis, this is not a shortcoming. The Medal of Honor recipients are eloquent, and their interviews require no elaboration. The stories are articulate and thought provoking, and provide insight into the backgrounds, thoughts, feelings, and memories of these uncommonly brave men. This is oral history at its best, and I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in the subjects of courage and valor under fire and how

“ordinary” men find it within themselves to answer the highest call on the battlefield.

LTC James H. Willbanks,
USA, Retired, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

HOW FREE CAN THE PRESS BE? Randall P. Bezanson, University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 2003, 258 pages, \$34.95.

How Free Can the Press Be? goes beyond narrow topics such as military-media mistrust, the public's right to know versus operational security, and the pros and cons of embedding reporters in units. This slim volume explores the purposes and limits of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press.

Leading First Amendment scholar Randall P. Bezanson has produced a stimulating and admirably evenhanded book that could not be more timely, given the grave dangers existing in our post-11 September 2001 world and the simultaneous expansion and ubiquity of media and information.

This book is like a Constitutional law seminar about nine court cases that run the gamut from the Pentagon Papers to hometown editors' travails with local politicians to a human cannonball who charged that television coverage of his act threatened his earning power. Through these vignettes, Bezanson, who writes highly entertaining, plain English, illuminates vexing questions of executive privilege, privacy, truth and fairness, fact and opinion, and media intrusiveness. He offers no solutions, but he equips readers to draw their own conclusions.

Most American journalists, like members of the U.S. military, regard themselves as professionals, servicing bedrock, fundamental values. For the former, these include truth and an informed public; for the latter, the twin beacons of mission accomplishment and the welfare of the troops.

Bezanson makes it plain that members of the news media run the gamut from the highly capable and honorable to the incompetent and dishonest. It is only fair to assume that the same qualities apply to government officials and military leaders. Both the media and military have institu-

tional imperatives—whether revenues and ratings, funding and self-protection. Bezanson points out that the First Amendment is not an absolute standard, but part of a Constitution that also grants important responsibilities and authority to the government.

The Constitution, famously described as “an invitation to conflict,” requires the balancing of competing values, interests, and duties when determining the extent and limits of press freedom. *How Free Can the Press Be?* is a thought-provoking book that makes readers reflect on this.

COL Alan Cate, USA,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania

NONE BRAVER: U.S. Air Force Pararescuemen in the War on Terrorism, Michael Hirsh, New American Library, New York, 2003, 320 pages, \$24.95.

Having read many history and theory books, occasionally I like to pick up a book that simply clears the mind and cleanses the palate. This was my intent when I picked up Michael Hirsh's *None Braver*, which tells the story of U.S. Air Force Pararescuemen (PJs) conducting operations in Afghanistan as part of the Global War on Terrorism.

The PJs, whose motto is “that others may live,” is an elite group of airmen who conduct downed aircrew recovery and medical evacuations in the most difficult situations. They go through an exhaustive selection process and rigorous training that includes basic airborne; high-altitude, low-opening parachute techniques (HALO); scuba; and extensive medical training. The PJs do “hard missions” and have lost at least five airmen in operations so far. They have earned several medals, including one Air Force Cross.

None Braver relates the PJ's missions in Afghanistan including aircrew recoveries, a HALO jump into a mine-field to save a seriously wounded Special Operations soldier, and action in Operation Anaconda.

Hirsh suffers from a kind of “Stockholm Syndrome,” however, as one of the first journalists embedded with a military unit. He is enamored with the PJs, and if any officer dis-

agrees with PJ recommendations, that officer is cast as a fool. No one is exempt from Hirsh's prejudice—Army officers, Special Operations leaders, and marines. Hirsh insults an Army staff officer for not having combat experience and six pages later abuses the same officer by asking, “Did no one on the general staff study the history of the valley before committing American forces?”

Hirsh should have concentrated on telling the tale of the brave men and women of the pararescue team instead of maligning those who did not agree with them.

LTC Jeffrey J. Gudmens, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WINNING MODERN WARS: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire, Wesley K. Clark, PublicAffairs, New York, 2003, 240 pages, \$25.00.

Before aborting his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, General Wesley K. Clark wrote *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire*, in which he assesses Operation Iraqi Freedom as a glorious victory for America. No disagreement there. He contends that the victory was due more to a 30-year process of overcoming the failings of Vietnam than to President George W. Bush's administration. Using weapons procured by former President Bill Clinton's administration, troops rolled largely unimpeded to victory after victory with an easy entry into Baghdad. There the operation fell apart, as the current administration failed to follow plans developed since the Cold War.

According to Clark, the war was not a good idea. Operation Iraqi Freedom diverted scarce resources, money, intelligence, Special Forces, and attention from Afghanistan to Iraq. The war also alienated Allies needed to fight terrorism. It reflected the unilateralism of the Bush administration; Clark sees unilateralism as bad.

Clark begins his description of the American empire with a historical survey of U.S. hegemony after World War II. The empire relied on a system of alliances, the United Nations, and economic cooperation.

The United States imposed its worldview on its allies and everyone benefited. Clark's vision of the future, however, is a return to the past. Clark also talks of environmental stewardship, providing for the disadvantaged at home, and other issues on the liberal agenda.

Clark's book, which is too superficial to serve as serious analysis, falls short as an expression of his vision for the future, and fails to specify where he would lead the United States, other than back to the “good old days.” Clark does not have a problem with preemption, but he wants the military to be used only as a last resort. A retired four-star general, Clark is more cautious, as most generals are, about how resources are used, because he knows it is costly to create the modern soldier.

Like Clark's candidacy, his book fails to realize its potential. Although interesting and easy to read, it adds little to the debate over where the United States should be heading and nothing on how to get there. Those seeking a new vision for the future will need to look elsewhere.

John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Yukon, Oklahoma

FLASH POINT NORTH KOREA: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, Richard A. Mobley, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2003, 216 pages, \$29.95.

Richard A. Mobley's *Flash Point North Korea* rolled off the press just as North Korea (NK) was once again proving intransigent in international negotiations by protesting legitimate U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. North Korea's current behavior parallels that of 35 years ago when it attacked the USS *Pueblo* and an EC-121M, an American surveillance aircraft. Both are subjects of Mobley's book.

Numerous accounts of the *Pueblo*'s capture have been published; however, considerably less has been released about the EC-121M's shoot down. Dividing his book between the two crises, Mobley has made a major contribution in his account of the military's diplomatic policy-making processes.

Several serious problems within the U.S. military, intelligence, and

diplomatic communities stand out. At the time of the *Pueblo* incident, the United States knew little about NK leadership other than that its actions were unpredictable. America's risk assessment was deficient, and its forces were not fully prepared to execute timely retaliatory operations.

The downing of the EC-121M presented different challenges for the North Koreans. Because of the EC-121M's destruction, no physical remnants existed for North Korea to flaunt and no reports of military captives galvanized the American public. NK media immediately informed the world that it had shot down an American plane, but because of a lack of evidence, America's response was slow and muted. Mobley points out that the U.S. military had not prepared contingency plans for striking NK airfields.

The overriding American consideration was to avoid resumption of a full-scale war on the Korean peninsula. The Department of Defense suspended its Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program worldwide, enraging President Richard M. Nixon.

Mobley observes that "[North Korea] remains a complex and obscure entity. It will almost certainly continue to provide foreign policy surprises for the United States and the Republic of Korea."

I highly recommend this skillfully crafted and superbly documented book. The notes and references, which run 30 pages, are in themselves a treasure.

LTC Douglass P. Bacon, USA,
Retired, Niceville, Florida

VICKSBURG IS THE KEY: The Struggle for the Mississippi River, William L. Shea and Terrence J. Winschel, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2003, 256 pages, \$35.00.

William Shea and Terrence Winschel's *Vicksburg is the Key: The Struggle for the Mississippi River* is an easily readable narrative that highlights the American Civil War's Federal campaign to control the Mississippi River. While often overshadowed by the Battle of Gettysburg, Vicksburg was no less important. Here Union General Ulysses S. Grant earned the reputa-

tion that would lead to his promotion as general in chief. Here too, Union General William T. Sherman learned of the advantages gained by separating his army from its base of supplies.

The importance of the Vicksburg siege can be seen in President Abraham Lincoln and Confederate President Jefferson Davis's attention to it. Neither the Union nor the Confederacy held any misconceptions about what the loss of Vicksburg would mean to their respective countries.

The book's one major shortcoming is its stated goal—"for students of battles and campaigns to incorporate nonmilitary themes in their accounts" and to view "military campaigns by looking beyond the battlefield and the headquarters tent to the wider political and social context within which these campaigns unfolded. . . ." Here the authors failed. With the exception of a few diary entries, Shea and Winschel ignore civilians, slaves, free blacks, and foot soldiers, focusing instead on the military histories of generals and battles.

Shea and Winschel detail the complexity of a multforce campaign, and resist the urge to glorify land battles at the expense of naval operations. Readers wanting a more complete look into the lives of the people who shaped the Nation will have to look elsewhere.

SSG Matthew D. Nedrow, USA,
Bellefonte, Philadelphia

HOMELAND CALLING: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, Paul Hockenos, Cornell University Press, Ithica, NY, 2003, 320 pages, \$27.95.

With *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars*, Paul Hockenos focuses critical attention on the role the Balkan diaspora played in fomenting and fighting the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Diaspora patriotism was at the heart of Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman's decisionmaking throughout the late 1980s as he prepared his republic for a separatist war. While he faced bleak times at home, a network of Croatian émigrés in Canada, America, and Australia nursed the

bright vision of a "thousand-year-old dream" of independence—one they would eventually turn into Tudjman's war plan. Hockenos admirably describes Gojko Susak as the key personality in this process. A Croatian-Canadian pizza maker, Susak launched himself into a brief, stellar wartime career as Tudjman's chief weapons buyer, largely on the strength of the diaspora support network he mobilized at Croatia's critical moment.

Hockenos's story of the Serbian diaspora's involvement in the Yugoslav breakup wars is a tragi-comedy of errors. With the full backing of Serbia's institutional apparatus, most notably the "Serbianized" Yugoslav People's Army, Serb separatists in Bosnia and nationalists in Kosovo needed little in the way of war support.

Nonetheless, certain memorable diaspora figures stepped forward to try to persuade the world of the justness of Serbia's military causes in the 1990s. New York's City University history professor Radmila Milentijevic left her job and home in 1989 to attend Milosevic's infamous rally at Kosovo and ended up his minister of information—the chief apologist of Serbia's war policies. Milentijevic led the propaganda machine that claimed that Serb forces did not commit atrocities in Bosnia and, later, that they had done so only in response to worse atrocities committed against Serbs. Milentijevic eventually became an object of ridicule even among Serbs for her slavish loyalty to Milosevic.

Hockenos's exploration of the Albanian diaspora's influence on Kosovo is the most far reaching and impressive of the discussions in *Homeland Calling*, perhaps because the Albanians were most successful of all the region's émigré communities in advancing nationalist agendas. The Albanian diaspora maintained a shadow government of Kosovo for 10 years, formed a proactive lobby in America, raised hundreds of millions of dollars, and built an army from scratch whose guerrilla accomplishments led to NATO's 1999 intervention and the ouster of Serbian forces from Kosovo.

Hockenos combines investigative journalism and historical analysis to produce a timely exposé. His accounts of prominent émigré personalities stand on their narrative appeal alone independent of their substantial political and military significance.

Homeland Calling even exceeds the scope Hockenos envisioned. While he dwells on the political and cultural implications of the diasporas' failures to internalize the liberal, tolerant values of their host countries, he also provides practical lessons on warfare for the military commander in the age of globalization.

Diaspora communities tend to expand their rear area of operations in any conflict to wherever it contributes to combat functions. Croatian and Albanian diasporas accomplished key tasks of command and control, training, and logistics in areas far removed from the front lines. It is quite new to see support functions dispersed in such a way.

Armies usually train and organize away from the fight, but what is new is the geographic location of those functions with the worldwide footprints of diaspora communities. Also notable is the speed and stealth with which diaspora support can be translated into combat power, as the Croats and Kosovar Albanians demonstrated in building their armies from nothing, largely beneath their opponents' intelligence radars.

Homeland Calling also illuminates the emerging significance of the commercialization of combat arms and support functions. In 1994, Croatia secured the services of Military Professional Resources, Incorporated, a commercial doctrine and training provider, to solidify Croatia's position as an instrument of U.S. policy for ending the war in Serbia. Commercialized combat support functions will be involved more and more in the plans and operations of nonstate actors as they seek unconventional ways to increase their combat power and to elude the vigilance of their opponents. Commanders and policymakers must accept this new commercial dimension of globalized battlespace.

**Matthew W. Herbert, CACI,
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**WAR AND FILM IN AMERICA:
Historical and Critical Essays.** Marilyn J. Matelski and Nancy Lynch Street, eds., McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, NC, 2003, 218 pages, \$32.00.

America's love affair with Hollywood and films is reflected in the military community in conversations about big screen depictions of war and its conditions. Editors Marilyn J. Matelski and Nancy Lynch Street's *War and Film in America: Historical and Critical Essays* explores America's relationship with war movies. The contributors, none of them active military, provide insights into movie themes from the end of World War II through the Cold War to the present.

The Global War on Terrorism most influences this book. While there is no single overriding trend of analysis, the specter of living in a post-11 September 2001 world is prevalent. The focus on contemporary conditions dominates the last few chapters where the authors' attention is on themes of American heroism and identity, examining such movies as *True Lies* (Twentieth Century Fox DVD, 2003), *Patriot Games* (Paramount Home Video, 2003), and *Dr. Strangelove, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (Culver City, CA: Columbia Tri-Star, 2001). Historical events are central in many essays, such as the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings chaired by Senator Joseph McCarthy or the influence of scholar Joseph Campbell's model of the hero's journey.

This thought-provoking book will appeal to movie fans as well as military professionals. Although the essays share common biases and perspectives, the authors' opinions vary significantly. The mixture of themes includes Richard A. Kallan's essay on "duty and pride," exemplified by *The Bridge on the River Kwai* (Culver City, CA: Columbia Tri-Star, 2000); a critical assessment of John Wayne and his emotionally-charged approach to filmmaking; and two essays examining the way Cold War productions affected the American social landscape.

The essays, which are solid, objective, and interesting, show how the movies have fit into the spectrum

of American life over the past 60 years.

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JORDAN IN TRANSITION 1990-2000, George Joffe, ed., Palgrave Press, New York, 402 pages, 2002, \$69.95.

Because it is Iraq's largest trading partner, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan matters in the complex diplomacy and military posturing of the Middle East. *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000* compares Jordan with World War I and II-era Belgium. Hostile regimes coveted Jordan's territory while on their way to invading or striking Israel. Jordan's stability is important to maintaining peace in the region.

Nineteen scholars write about the domestic, economic, social, and political changes Jordan has faced in the last decade (1990-2000). Markus Bouillon of Oxford University examines the careful balancing act that King Abdullah I, King Hussein, and the current monarch, King Abdullah II, have undertaken to maintain their independence from hostile dictatorships like those in Syria and Iraq.

Jordan nearly lost its identity to Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul-Nasser and to uncontrollable Palestinian Liberation Organization fighters. Internally Jordan contends with a sizable Palestinian population as well as tribes whose loyalties it guarantees through social and economic benefits.

King Hussein, brutally honest about Jordan's economic vulnerabilities, declared Jordan's bankruptcy before the 1990 Arab Summit. To bolster its Arab nationalist credentials before invading Kuwait, Iraq provided Jordan with 80 percent of its oil requirements, which might explain why Jordan did not openly join an anti-Baghdad coalition.

Maen Nsour, a Jordanian economist at the Ministry of Planning assesses how fiscal constraints affected Jordan's national security. The government is slowly trying to educate the population of the fact that the current welfare state cannot be maintained, embraces efforts to liberalize the economy, and has signed Free Trade Agreements with the

United States and the European Union. Nsour worries that reforms could alienate a segment of the society, driving them to become Islamists.

King Abdullah II has been innovative in dealing with Islamist parties in Jordan. Realizing the importance of giving the people a forum, he also warned that he would not tolerate violence or attempts at circumventing Jordan's constitution. He shut down presses that he felt fomented violence and recently kicked out Al-Jazeera. As a result, nations like Egypt have taken a harsher Jordanian-style approach, not distinguishing between Islamic militants and less radical Islamic political groups. In 1989, Algeria's attempt to use King Abdullah's methods resulted in a civil war.

The book describes ways in which Arab nations can move toward a pluralistic political society and the fear that Arab intellectuals have that

moderate Islamic parties might eventually impose on Jordan's democratically elected government.

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A FIGHTER FROM WAY BACK:
The Mexican War Diary of Lt. Daniel Harvey Hill, 4th Artillery USA,
Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., and Timothy D. Johnson, eds., The Kent State University Press, OH, 2002, 231 pages, \$39.00.

With the continuing popularity of Civil War publications, it seems logical that the next step would be to publish tangentially-related material. Thus it is that erstwhile Confederate Daniel Harvey Hill's patchy Mexican War diary has been edited and printed.

While Hill's war diary is not uninteresting or insignificant, one must question the motives of its release. The Mexican War itself is not a topic

commonly thought to have mainstream appeal, although it could appeal to future Civil War buffs who want to cut their teeth on the Mexican War.

Hill's diary is incomplete. The editors fill in the blanks with speculative narrative, not poorly written, but not history per se either. The result is a truncated diary combined with the speculative narrative of an artillery lieutenant performing as an infantry lieutenant.

A Fighter From Way Back: The Mexican War Diary of Lt. Daniel Harvey Hill, 4th Artillery USA is a good peek into the living conditions of a soldier from a different historical period, but it cannot stand alone as a work on the Mexican War. As a supplement to give an inside view of one soldier's experiences, it has value, however.

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